We investigate a problem of admission control and pricing in a firm which dominates the market. In the model, there is a single server with exponential service times and arrivals follow a compound Poisson process where the number of customers in a group is an arbitrary discrete random variable. Each arriving group calculates the expected return for the whole group using the waiting cost per unit time, the current queue length, the price provided by the firm and the substitute product reward. It is assumed the firm is a monopoly and price maker per se. The firm's problem is to set state dependent prices for arriving batches. Once the prices have been set we formulate the admission control problem for the firm, which is a Markov decision process. Properties of the pricing and value functions are characterized, as are the optimal admission policies for a revenue maximizing firm and a social optimizer.
Introduction
A monopoly is a market where there is a sole supplier of a product or service. The existence of a monopoly depends on different barriers which prevent other firms from entering the market. An Italian restaurant in a small town might be an example of a monopoly. Suppose nearest town is miles away. Although customers could drive to the nearest Italian restaurant in the next town, the time and cost of the drive limits this choice. In the aforementioned example, the location of the restaurant limits the availability of a substitute product and the market size of the town creates a barrier to entry for new firms planning to invest.
The Italian restaurant mentioned in the previous example, with local monopoly power, has the chance to charge different prices to different customers based on non-cost related features of the customers in order to extract customer surplus and turn it into additional revenue. This pricing strategy is called price discrimination and it requires market power, customer segmentation and strong barriers between customer segments. Price discrimination can be achieved by providing different prices or by offering different discounts to different customers. In the case of the Italian restaurant, the restaurant owner can use his market power to charge different prices based on the size of the customer group, or the expected waiting time, to increase his revenue. So, the main problem of the restaurant owner is choosing the optimal price points in order to maximize his revenue.
Instances similar to the previous example exist in the service and manufacturing sectors. Airplane manufacturing, high precision robot production and high-end computer processor manufacturing are industries where customer orders are often taken in groups and because of high inventory holding costs, production is usually make-to-order. An example of a near monopoly in the service sector would be an expert computer technician in a small town, who provides repair service to locally owned businesses and other personal computer owners. Although there might be other options to fix a computer problem, a highly skilled technician would often be preferred over other options. The customer base in this case would likely consist of computer owners with one computer and small businesses utilizing multiple computers. Similar to the restaurant owner, the computer technician wishes to choose a pricing strategy that maximizes her revenue.
In this paper, we investigate the admission control and pricing problem of a monopolistic firm which dominates the market. We assume the firm is a near monopoly and price maker per se. Although the firm under consideration dominates the market, a substitute product is available. The firm has the ability to change the price based on the number of customers in the system and the size of the arriving batch. This pricing ability also indirectly allows the firm to exert admissions control by, for example, setting the price high enough such that it is not advantageous for the incoming batch to enter the system. We also examine the admission control problem for a social optimizer.
Our model consists of a single server whose service times are exponentially distributed. Customer arrivals follow a compound Poisson process where the number of customers in a group is a non-negative discrete random variable. The firm and each arriving customer group maximize their expected discounted return and arriving customers calculate the expected return for the whole group using the waiting cost per unit time, the observed queue length, the price provided by the firm and the substitute product reward. Batches are served in First-Come-First-Serve (FCFS) order, with the customers within a batch being served in an arbitrary order. It is assumed that customers are aware that service among batches is FCFS. The aim is to find the strategy that maximizes the firm's expected discounted revenue. For each fixed state, consisting of the current system size and the size of the incoming batch, it is clear that the firm should choose the maximum price which induces the batch to join, if it is optimal to have the batch join. If not, a higher price is set. Thus, the problem can be decomposed into a static pricing problem, and a dynamic admissions problem.
Leeman [8] was one of the researchers to discuss the control of queues via pricing and that paper lists various real life examples where pricing might be helpful to control a queue. Naor [12] , in a seminal paper, used a single server queueing model to investigate a pricing problem for a monopoly. Naor investigated the reward maximization problem of individual customers, the firm, and society as a whole. By definition, "society" consists of the customers and the firm, and transactions within society do not change the total social welfare. Naor pointed out that under individual optimization a customer's choice to join the queue is not socially optimal since the decision is solely based on the customer's own waiting cost instead of the cost to the whole society. Specifically, the customer does not properly take into account the negative externalities she imposes on customers arriving later. To achieve social optimality, Naor suggested charging a fee for service to motivate customers to make socially optimal decisions. He also showed that the aforementioned social welfare optimizing fee is smaller than the firm's profit maximizing fee.
Knudsen [7] extended the single server results to multi-server queues with general waiting cost functions. Edelson and Hildebrand [4] showed that when customers are forced to make a decision before observing the state of the system, then the profit maximizing fee is equal to the social welfare optimizing fee. Lipmann and Stidham [9] studied queueing systems with holding costs and discounting. This paper was one of the first in a series that considered state dependent fees to achieve social optimality. Stidham [16] and Stidham and Johansen [6] extended previous results to include general renewal arrival processes and general service times. They also considered batch arrivals with partial acceptance.
In a pair of papers, Chen and Frank [1, 2] analyzed a monopoly that can adjust the price of service as the number of customers in the system changes. They assumed that customers and the firm maximize their expected discounted return. In Chen and Frank [1] , it is shown that a near monopoly's profit maximizing pricing policy achieves social optimality by collecting customer surplus. Maglaras [10] considered a make-to-order production firm that offers multiple products to a market where arrival rates are controllable. Instead of using the standard Markov decision process framework, fluid and diffusion approximation models are utilized to achieve a better understanding of the problem.Örmeci and Burnetas [13] considered the problem of dynamic admission control in a multi-class Markovian loss system with batch arrivals. They assumed that the system can employ batch acceptance, in which it can either accept or reject the entire batch, or partial acceptance, where some of the jobs in a batch can be admitted and the remaining ones rejected. All jobs require an exponential service time with the same rate and jobs are differentiated only by their reward. Dynamic admission policies that maximize the total expected discounted reward of a two class Markovian loss system with different service rates were examined inÖrmeci and Burnetas [14] . Finally, Ç il et al. [3] investigated an admission control problem in a limited capacity single server queue with batch arrivals. They derived structural results for policies which maximize a total discounted profit function.
In our work, similar to Chen and Frank [1] , we let the firm adjust the price as the length of the queue changes. We extend that model with the assumption of batch arrivals. Although batch arrivals also occur in the work ofÖrmeci and co-authors, all of their papers considered limited buffer systems. Furthermore, we do not allow partial batch acceptance, in contrast to [13, 14] . The primary contributions of the paper are as follows. After solving the static pricing problem, we formulate the control problem to determine the optimal admissions policy for the firm. Using properties of the price and value function we are able to reduce the state space of this problem, allowing for simpler computations. These same properties also provide some form of monotonicity structure on the optimal policy. However, we also show numerically that the optimal policy cannot be characterized by a one-dimensional threshold on the sum of the arriving batch size and current system size. Finally, as in other models with state dependent pricing, we demonstrate that the revenue maximizing admission policy and socially optimal admission policy are identical.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model, analyze the posting price, and formulate the firm's Markov decision process. Section 3 investigates properties of the price and value functions. In Section 4 we first consider the admission control problem for a revenue maximizing firm, and provide computational results for this problem. We then consider the admission problem for a social optimizer and show that the revenue maximizer and social optimizer decisions coincide. Section 5 provides conclusions and directions for further research.
Model and Notation
Our model consists of a single server, which represents the firm. Customer arrivals follow a compound Poisson process where the arrival rate of a customer group of size x ∈ X, X ⊆ Z + is denoted by λ x , and where the total (group) arrival rate is given by λ = x∈X λ x . Customers are served one at a time with batches being served in FCFS order. Within a given batch, customers can be served in any order (we assume below that decisions are made based on the service time of the entire group). Customer service times are i.i.d. exponential(µ) random variables. In the sequel, the terms "batch" and "group" are used interchangeably.
Customers in the same group act as one entity and customer groups that are equal in size have a homogeneous valuation for the service provided by the firm. For a customer group of size x, the reward that would be received by the group after completion of service is R(x), the waiting cost for the group per unit time is c(x) and if the group chooses not to join the system there exists a substitute product with net discounted reward v(x). It is assumed that the firm has prior knowledge of the customer reward and cost functions. This information is used to adjust the posted pricep(i, x) where i is the number of customers in the system. When a customer group of size x arrives, the number of customers in the system and the posted price for a customer group size x is observed. Then the expected net discounted reward that will be received is calculated using a discount factor γ. If the calculated reward is greater than or equal to the net discounted reward of the substitute product, then the customer group joins the system, otherwise it does not join, choosing instead to purchase the substitute product.
Given a function f (x, y) with a discrete domain, we define the first discrete derivative of f (x, y) with respect to x to be ∆ x f (x, y) := f (x, y) − f (x − 1, y) and the second discrete derivative with respect to x to be ∆
Static Analysis of the Maximum Posting Price
The first step is to calculate the expected discounted reward for an arriving customer group of size x based on the price provided by the firm, assuming the group encounters i customers in the system. This allows us to calculate the maximum posting price for the firm.
Given the number of customers in the system is i, the time spent in the system until all customers in the arriving customer group leave the system is represented by random variable τ which is distributed gamma(x + i, µ). The price published for a customer group of size x, when the number of customers in the system is i, is denoted byp(i, x). The fee is paid when the customer group decides to join to the system and the reward is obtained when all customers in the arriving customer group are served. Under these assumptions, the expected net discounted reward, denoted by E R (i, x) is given by:
Note that the only random quantity in the previous equation is τ ∼ gamma(x + i, µ). Next, setting θ := µ/(µ + γ), the Laplace-Stieltjes transform of τ is
Now the expected net discounted reward becomes
Recall that a customer group will pay the entry pricep(i, x) and join the queue if the expected net reward is greater than or equal to v(x). In other words to convince a customer group to join the queue, the firm must set the price by considering the inequality below:
Now, given a posted pricep(i, x), a group of size x joins the queue if the number of customers in the system satisfiesp
where
As stated earlier, the firm has prior knowledge of the customers' cost and reward functions and it may use this information to determine the maximum price that can be charged. Note that whenever the expected net discounted reward is equal to the discounted reward of the substitute product, customer groups are indifferent between the two products or services. We assume customer groups that are indifferent between the two products join the queue. When the right-hand side of (2) is greater than zero, then this expression defines the maximum price that the firm can charge customer groups in that situation. Since any price less than or equal to this maximum price induces customer groups to join the system, the firm should post the highest possible price to maximize revenue. Also note that the posted price should always be nonnegative, i.e., it is not advantageous for the firm to pay customers to join the queue. Thus if the right-hand side of (2) is less than zero the firm posts a price of 0 and in this situation customer groups are better off when they choose the substitute product. With these arguments in mind we define the maximum price, denoted as p(i, x) to be:
MDP Formulation of the Firm's Decision Process
We model the revenue maximizing firm's decisions with a continuous time Markov decision process (CTMDP). A CTMDP is defined by five elements: a state space S, an action space A = ∪ s∈S A s , a law of motion q(·|s, a) conditioned on action a ∈ A s taken when the state of system is s, a transition time t(·|s, a, s ) and a reward r(t, s, a, s ). The dynamics of a CTMDP can be summarized as follows: assume that at a particular time point, the system is in state s ∈ S then we choose an action a from the set of available actions A s . At this point, the system moves to another state s ∈ S with probability q(s |s, a) where the probability is conditioned on the current state of the system s and the action a taken. The time spent before the system moves to state s is an exponential random variable t(·|s, a, s ) conditioned on the action taken, the current state and the final state. The reward r(t, s, a, s ) may depend on all four of the given arguments.
The state of the system is defined by the number of customers waiting in the system and the size of the arriving customer group. The customer group size is an element of the set X which is defined as X = {0} ∪ X. The group size 0 is included to represent departures in our model. To be explicit, the state space is S :
}, where i is the queue length.
At each decision epoch, the firm has at most two actions available to it: accepting(ac) or rejecting(rj) the arriving customer group. For all i, when x = 0 the action set is limited to A (i,0) = {ac}, otherwise the action space is A (i,x) = {ac, rj}. The transition rates of the CTMDP which are conditioned on the state of the system and the action taken are defined below:
Next, we use uniformization to create the corresponding discrete time Markov decision process (MDP). Under the standard transformation using dummy transitions, we can assume an overall rate of events bounded above by λ + µ. This leads to the following transition probabilities in the uniformized chain:
We assume that the firm's reward consists of the price charged when a customer group joins the system. For all i > 0 and x ∈ X define the reward function of the firm to be r((i, x), ac) := p(i, x), otherwise the reward is set to zero. By standard results from the theory of Markov decision processes (see, e.g., Theorem 11.3.2 in [15] ) there exists an optimal stationary deterministic policy for both the CTMDP and the uniformized chain.
Let V n (i, x) denote the discounted value function of the firm in the finite time horizon problem, when there are n transitions remaining, i customers in the system, and the batch size of the next arriving customer group is x. Then V n+1 is given by
Define Λ := λ + µ + γ where γ is the discount rate. For n, i ≥ 1, x ∈ X, we now rewrite the value function by expanding, and then simplifying the terms, using some of the previous definitions:
For n, i ≥ 1, x = 0, it is easier to rewrite the value function since there is no decision to make:
For simplicity, define
Then the Bellman equations for the value function are
For the infinite time horizon problem, one has the analogous Bellman equations:
Hereafter, for quantities pertaining to the infinite horizon problem we omit the subscript n.
3 Functional Properties
Properties of the Price Function
In this section we first introduce some additional assumptions on the customer's cost and reward functions. We then describe how the price function behaves with respect to the number of customers in the system and the arriving batch size. It is natural to assume that the rewards and costs are nondecreasing in x: In this case, we have the following theorem. 
For all i ≥ 0, p(i, x) is convex with increasing i.

There exists an
Proof. For a fixed batch size x ∈ X, we analyze the effect of the number of customers in the system on the price. A negative first discrete derivative of the price function with respect to i for all i ≥ 0, x ∈ X indicates that p(i, x) is decreasing with increasing i. For all x ∈ X, we have
Since the reward and the cost functions are strictly positive by Assumption 1 and 0 < θ < 1 by definition, the last expression is strictly less than zero. This concludes the proof of the first part. To prove the convexity property, we have to check the sign of the second derivative of the price function p(i, x) with respect to i. Recall that ∆ 
The last inequality holds because θ is positive and first derivative is strictly negative. Thus the second derivative is positive for all i ≥ 1 which in return implies the convexity property of the price function. To prove the third part, we note that if p(i, x) is positive then the term in brackets in (3) must be positive:
Note that right-hand side of the last inequality does not depend on i, so for the remainder of the proof we denote this expression by k(x). Given a customer group size of x, the maximum price is positive if and only if i satisfies
For a fixed x, the right-hand side is constant and can be smaller than zero. Then it is clear that we can use (4) to define i x :
Note that when the queue length is greater than or equal to i x , the maximum price is equal to zero and the firm will deter customer groups of size x by setting the price to zero.
As stated earlier, the firm is not willing to pay customers to convince them to join the system. When all prices are zero or negative, it is meaningless for the firm to provide service. We thus introduce the following assumption to avoid trivial models.
Assumption 2.
There exists
If Assumption 2 is not satisfied, all customer groups are forced to choose the substitute product since it is the only option available in the market.
The Linear Cost and Reward Case
In general, if there is no structure on the cost and reward functions, little can be said about optimal pricing policies, which are functions of both queue length and the size of an arriving customer group. With some additional structure, a significant amount analysis can be done. We undertake a thorough investigation of the linear case, codified in Assumption 3, in the remainder of the paper. Remarks. We can analytically evaluate both of the critical values in Theorem 3.2. A little algebra shows that x = x + 1 where x is
and w is the solution of the following equation
where κ is defined as
If we view x as a function of i, then it can be seen that x i is nonincreasing with increasing i. Note that with increasing i the left-hand side of (7) increases, and as a consequence w increases and x i is nonincreasing.
From the proof of the second part of the theorem it can be seen that x is constant for all i and can be formulated as x = 2θ 1−θ + 2. Further note that the second term on the right hand side of (6) is always negative because ln θ is always negative and w is positive since the left-hand side of (7) must be positive. Therefore, we can conclude that x is always greater than
In light of this information, one can infer the shape of the price function. For all i ∈ Z + , the price function increases with a decreasing rate up to group size x i and decreases with increasing rate up to group size x . After that, the function keeps decreasing with a decreasing rate. Therefore, for each i ∈ Z + there exists a group size x * i such that for all x > x * i the price is negative. This motivates the following definition of x * i :
Numerical Example
Next, the theorems given in this section are demonstrated with an example. Based on the remarks above one can calculate x , x i , and x * i for different values of i.
Consider a problem with X = Z + and the following parameters and functions: R(x) = 1000x, c(x) = 5x, γ = 0.095, v(x) = 50x, and µ = 2. It can be shown that x = 45 and x 0 = 18 for i = 0. Figure 1 illustrates the change in price with the change of arriving group size when the queue is empty. Table 1 shows how these three values change as the number of customers waiting in the queue increases. 
Properties of the Value Function
In the theorem below we state a few properties of the value function which will be useful in later sections. Theorem 3.3 is proved in Appendix A. 
For a fixed x ∈ X and 0 ≤ n ≤ ∞, p(i, x) + U n (i, x) is a nonincreasing function of
i ≥ 1. The second part of the theorem confirms the intuition that the value of a customer group decreases as the number of customers in the system increases. The third part pertains to infinite horizon problems. It implies that a group of size x ∈ X will be accepted by the firm when the system is empty, ruling out the pathological case that the system empties and never accepts any customers once it reaches this state.
If Assumption 2 also holds, then
∃ x ∈ X, such that p(0, x) + U (x) − U (0) ≥ 0.
Revenue and Social Optimization 4.1 Revenue Maximization -Policy Evaluation
In order to evaluate the firm's optimal policy, in theory one must solve the uniformizied MDP, which has an infinite state space. However, due to the results proved in previous sections the state space can be reduced to a finite set, potentially allowing exact evaluation of the optimal policy via a standard MDP method. Thus, as a first step, we describe the state space reduction.
Under Assumption (3), the maximum price is positive if and only if
where κ is defined by equation (8) . Note that the right-hand side of the inequality is constant and for all states that do not satisfy this inequality, the price is set to zero and the customer group is deterred. Define i * as follows:
Note that the third part of Theorem 3.3 implies that there exists an x ∈ X such that a group of size x is accepted by the firm when the system is empty. This rules out the possibility that i * takes the value zero. For all i ≥ i * , we reject any arriving customer group, since the maximum price that could be charged is negative. So for all i ≥ i * and x ∈ X, V (i, x) = U (i), and
In light of this calculation, the definition x * i can be refined as follows:
Assuming there are currently i customers in the system, we deter any customer group of size x, if x ≥ x * i , since the maximum price that could be charged for such a group is negative. So for all i ≥ 0 and x ≥ x * i , V (i, x) = U (i), and
Note then that the state space of the problem is finite, bounded by i * in the queue length and bounded by x * i for each i < i * in the customer group size. With this in mind, one can use policy iteration, value iteration or linear programming methods to identify the value function and the optimal policy. Although linear programming might not be the most efficient method for solving larger instances of the problem on hand, we utilized the linear programming approach to solve smaller instances due to fact that it is easy to use commercial solvers and set up linear programming models. The reader is referred to Appendix B for the description of the linear programming model utilized in this section.
A natural question at this point is: Can it be shown that the optimal policy belongs to the family of threshold policies? Although several instances that we solve indicate that there exists a threshold for a group size that can be accepted for each i < i * , deriving a closed form optimal policy is non-trivial due to the nonlinearity of the value function.
Next, we examine a sample problem and identify the optimal policy. We also investigate the sensitivity of the optimal policy to changing parameters. The customer cost and reward functions associated with the sample problem are R(x) = 20x, c(x) = x, v(x) = 5x, and γ = 0.095. The arrival and service rates are λ = 1 and µ = 2. The arrival rate of each group with size of one to fourteen is positive and identical. Table 2 shows the maximum party size that is accepted for each value of the queue length and the value function associated with this pair.
In the problem, it should be first observed that although the posted price is positive for a group of 10 when there are 4 or fewer customers in the system, the firm prefers to reserve space for future arrivals by deterring them. In other words, a higher utilization does not always maximize revenue. On the other hand, note that the optimal policy can be characterized by a threshold on the sum of the current queue length and arriving group size. In particular, if the number of people in the queue plus the arriving party size exceeds nine, the firm refuses to accept the arriving party. In the second sample problem, in order to understand the sensitivity of the optimal policy to increased capacity, the service rate is increased to µ = 3 while all other parameters remain as in the first example. With the increased capacity, the waiting time and cost associated with waiting time is smaller. In return, the firm has the ability to charge more and can handle larger groups. Table 3 illustrates how the maximum party size increases along with the value function associated with each value of queue length. On the other hand, notice that unlike the first sample problem, the optimal policy is not characterized by a unique threshold value on the sum of the queue length and arriving group size. When the queue length is zero, the threshold on this sum is 13, whereas the threshold is 12 when there is one or more customers in the system. Finally, to understand the sensitivity of the optimal policy to increased offered load, in the third example, both the service and arrival rates are set to µ = 3 and λ = 2, while all other parameters are kept as in the first example. Note that an increase in offered load (i.e., traffic intensity) does not necessarily correspond to an increase in system utilization, since the firm may choose to reject more customers, depending on the other system parameters.
With the increased arrival rate and offered load, the firm has to reduce the maximum group size admitted to save space for the most profitable customers. Table 4 illustrates how the maximum party size decreases while the value function increases. Observe once again that the threshold on the sum of queue length and arriving group size varies: it is 10 when there are at most 2 people in the queue and 9 otherwise.
Social Welfare Optimality
Social welfare optimality is achieved when we consider the welfare of the whole society, which is composed of the firm and the customers. In consideration of social welfare, the price paid by customers has no effect on social optimality. Although the welfare of the members of the society changes with such payments, the total welfare of the society remains constant.
To optimize social welfare, we have to maximize the difference between the total benefit received from the service and associated costs such as waiting cost and holding cost. A social optimizer starts with knowledge of the customers' waiting cost function, the reward function of the original product and the reward function for the substitute product. Up to this point we have assumed that customer groups first make the decision either to join or not to join the system and then the firm either accepts or deters the customer considering their expected return. From now on, we assume that a social optimizer controls the decisions of the customers and the firm considers the social welfare (an alternate view is to assume that the social optimizer controls the posted price, which in turn affects the customers' decisions, in a socially optimal way). This problem is similar to the original decision problem of the firm. We omit the detailed derivations, which are similar to previous arguments.
Although the construction of the discounted value function of society is similar to that for the discounted value function of the revenue maximizing firm, the two reward functions differ. If a customer group of size x joins the system, the expected reward received by society is equal to the reward received by the customer group minus the waiting cost. Thus, the expected reward to society is
Using the earlier definition of the maximum posted price p(i, x) we rewrite the expected reward to society:
Let r s ((i, x) , a) denote the reward function of society based on the action a taken. If an arriving customer group with size x is accepted to the system, r s ((i, x) 
. Using the definition of the reward function of the firm given in Section 2.2, r s ((i, x) , a) can be reformulated as follows: r s ((i, x), a) = r((i, x), a) + v(x) .
We let S n (i, x) denote the discounted value function of society, when there are 0 ≤ n < ∞ transitions remaining, i ∈ Z + customers in the system, and the batch size of next arriving customer group is x ∈ X. S n (i, x) can be formulated as
We omit the subscript on the discounted value function for the infinite time horizon model and denote it by S(i, x). The next result indicates that the decision process of society is same as the decision process of the firm.
Theorem 4.1. The discounted value function of the society S(i, x) can be written in terms of the discounted value function of the firm as follows:
where α is defined as:
Hence, the decision process that maximizes the revenue of the firm is same as the decision process that maximizes social welfare.
The relation between S(i, x)
and V (i, x) in Theorem 4.1 is proved in Appendix A. Chen and Frank [1] demonstrated a similar relationship for the case without batch arrivals (see Proposition 3 in that paper). To establish the second part of the theorem we argue as in [1] . For a fixed batch size x there exists a threshold system size i x which determines when the firm stops accepting batches of size x. Since the difference between the value functions of the firm and society are is independent of i, they have the same threshold size, and thus the decision processes are identical.
Conclusion
In this work, we investigate the optimal admission and policy of a monopolistic firm with batch arrivals, discounting and state dependent pricing. The results imply that the firm might reject customers, even if the posted price is positive, to accommodate future customers. Although the social planner considers the benefits both of the customers and the firm, the pricing that maximizes social welfare coincides with the revenue maximizing firm's pricing. The reason for this phenomenon is that the firm's pricing strategy allows the firm to extract the surplus of the value received from the service of each customer.
As mentioned above, our basic assumptions on model dynamics and pricing are similar to those found in Chen and Frank [1, 2] ,Örmeci and Burnetas [13, 14] , and Ç il et al. [3] . Thus, we view the model as contributing to this stream of work, which essentially originated with Naor [12] . However, a number of model extensions are possible and we discuss those here. One restrictive assumption is that batches are served in FCFS order. Such an assumption is reasonable in some settings where small personal orders are put in a separate FCFS queue from large industrial orders (e.g., some PC makers employ such policies). However, in other settings it makes sense to allow the system controller to prioritize the batches in a general way so as to extract additional revenue from customers. In this case, the problem would become a joint batch sequencing and admission problem. Another way to extend the model would be to allow "dynamic pricing" as seen in Maglaras and Meissner [11] . In such a model, it is assumed that the firm can affect the demand rate (or arrival rate) via pricing. Hence the firm effectively has direct control over arrival rates. Adding such features would certainly be of interest, but they would likely lead to a less tractable control problem. Such problems can often be attacked by passing to an approximation, and this is a subject for future research.
In the case of single customers (no batch arrivals), it has been shown that the optimal admission policy is a threshold policy, i.e., a policy in which the firm stops serving when the number of customers in the system exceeds a fixed number. As demonstrated in Section 4, the optimal admission policy for the batch arrival model cannot be reduced to a simple threshold policy, where the threshold is the sum of the current system size and arriving batch size. Hence, it is likely that the joint admission and sequencing problem mentioned above would not be amenable to exact analysis. Our model could also be extended by incorporating competition in the market and relaxing the monopoly assumption. In this case, the firm would determine the posted price based on the market price and customer price sensitivity information. 
We want to show that right side of the above equation is decreasing and find the minimum value of x that satisfies
Under Assumption 3 the cost and reward functions can be replaced by linear forms which we assume, with a slight abuse of notation, to be: R(x) := Rx, c(x) := cx, and v(x) := vx. Now, rewriting the formula above yields:
It can be shown that the expression on the left-hand side is decreasing in x since
Hence there exists a threshold value x as claimed in the first part of the theorem. Thus, we can conclude that ∆ x p(i, x + 1) ≥ 0 if and only if:
where κ is defined by equation (8) .
We now proceed to prove the second part of the proposition. The second derivative of p(i, x) with respect to x is
As before we replace R(x), c(x), v(x), with linear functions to obtain:
In the last expression all terms except x(1 − θ) − 2θ are positive. Hence, the sign of the last term determines the sign of ∆ 2 x p(i, x + 2). This expression is an increasing function of x, and since θ is a constant one can show that
Hence there exists a threshold value x as claimed in the second part of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.
The proof is separated into three parts.
Part 1
For a fixed x ∈ X and 0 ≤ n ≤ ∞ we want to show that ∆ i V n (i, x) ≤ 0, ∀ i ≥ 1. For n = 0, the result follows easily from definitions, since for all x ∈ X and i ∈ Z
Given that the maximum price p(i, x) is always nonnegative, we have
where i x is defined explicitly in (5). It is clear that ∆ i V 1 (i, x) ≤ 0 in the last two cases, and the first part of Theorem 3.1 implies that the same holds in the first case.
Next, for n ≥ 2, an upper bound on ∆ i V n (i, x) is utilized to prove the result:
Denote the upper bound, given by the right-hand side of (10), by υ n (i, x).
We now outline the argument which validates inequality (10) . ∆ i V n (i, x) can take four different values. Two of these values are included in the maximum given in inequality (10). Now assume
. In that case:
An analogous argument shows that the fourth possible value is bounded by υ n (i, x).
Up to this point, we have shown that the price p(i, x) decreases with an increasing number of customers in the system but we do not know much about U n (i) − U n (i − 1). If we can show that this value is less than or equal to zero for all i, then we can conclude that
We are now prepared to invoke an induction argument. So, suppose for a fixed n ≥ 1 (11) and (12) 
This and the first part of Theorem 3.1 imply υ n (i, x) ≤ 0 and so ∆ i V n (i, x) ≤ 0, completing the induction step.
Part 2:
The proof of the second part follows from the first part of Theorem 3.1 and from the Part 1 argument that U n (i) − U n (i − 1) ≤ 0, ∀ i ≥ 1: Some algebra yields:
.
Since U (0) > 0, the last equation implies Λ−µ = x∈X λ x . But for any γ > 0, the definition of Λ gives Λ − µ > x∈X λ x , a contradiction. We conclude that there exists an x ∈ X such that p(0, x) + U (x) − U (0) ≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We identify the relation between the discounted value function of the firm and of society for all n ≥ 1 and use this relation to prove the desired result. For n = 1, the discounted value function of society is given by: By utilizing equation (9) and the boundary conditions S 0 (j, y) = 0 for all j ∈ Z + and y ∈ X, we can rewrite S 1 (i, x) as follows: In the third equality above we used the fact that the availability of the reward v(x) is independent of the action taken to move it outside the maximum. In the last equality, the definition of V 1 (i, x) is used to obtain the relationship between two value functions. Since the group size that corresponds to the next arrival is independent of the decision made, the current queue length, and past arrivals, the second term on the right-hand side of the equation above can be simplified as follows: 
Now denote the right-hand side of equation (13) The limiting procedure is valid based on general results from the theory of Markov decision processes (see, e.g., Proposition 3.1 in [5] ).
firm should reject the arriving customer group when the number in the system is i. On the other hand, if V (i, x) > U (i), which in return implies V (i, x) = p(i, x) + U (i, x), then the firm should accept the arriving customer group.
